Curriculum Vitae
Mathias Frisch
6806 Wells Pkwy Department of Philosophy
University Park,
MD University
of Maryland
mfrisch@umd.edu Skinner Building
College Park, MD 20742
Employment:
August
2003 – present: Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, University
of Maryland, College Park.
August
1998 – June 2003: Assistant
Professor, Department of Philosophy, Northwestern University.
Education:
Ph.D. Philosophy, University of California
at Berkeley, 1998.
(Dissertation: Theories,
Models, and Explanation.)
M.A. Physics, University of California at
Berkeley, 1992.
B.A. Physics,
University of California at Berkeley, 1990.
Areas of Specialization:
Philosophy of Science, Philosophy of Physics.
Areas of Competence:
Metaphysics, Epistemology, Logic, History of Modern
Philosophy.
Honors
and Awards:
National
Science Foundation Fellowship, award no. SES-0093212,
8/15/2001-5/31/2002.
National Endowment for the Humanities
Fellowship, award no. FA-36796-01,
6/1/2002-12/31/2002.
Publications:
Book (forthcoming):
Inconsistency, Asymmetry, and
Non-Locality: Philosophical Issues in
Classical Electrodynamics,
Oxford University Press.
Papers:
“Laws and Initial Conditions,” Philosophy of Science (forthcoming 2004).
“Lorentz’s Cautious Realism.” Conditionally accepted for publication in Studies in the History and Philosophy of
Modern Physics.
“Non-Locality in Classical
Electrodynamics.” British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science (March 2002), 1-19.
“(Dis-)Solving the Puzzle of the Arrow of
Radiation,” British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science 51 (September 2000), 381-410.
“Van Fraassen’s Dissolution of Putnam’s
Model-Theoretic Argument,” Philosophy of
Science, 66 (March 1999), 158-164.
“The World According to Maxwell,” Discussion Paper Series of the Centre
for the Philosophy of the Natural and the Social Sciences, London (1998).
Papers
Submitted for Publication:
“Classical
Electrodynamics and the Role of Consistency in Scientific Theories.”
resubmitted to Philosophy of Science.
Book Reviews:
“Nancy
Cartwright’s The Dappled World: A Study of the Boundaries of Science.” together with: E. Winsberg, A. Fine, K. Darling. The Journal of Philosophy XCVII, 7 (July 2000), 403-408.
Papers
Delivered:
Invited
Papers:
“Causation, Counterfactuals and Entropy,”
invited speaker at the conference “Causal Republicanism,” Sydney, July 2003.
“A Tale of Two Arrow,” invited speaker at the annual University of
Western Ontorio Philosophy of Science Conference, May 2003.
“Counterfactuals and the Past
Hypothesis,” invited speaker at the symposium “Entropy and Counterfactuals,”
2003 APA Central Division Meeting, Cleveland, April 2003.
“David Lewis’s Overdetermination Thesis
or The Perils of Armchair Physical Theorizing:” presented at:
-
University
of Minnesota, Twin Cities, January 2003.
-
University
of California at Santa Barbara, January 2003.
-
University
of Maryland, College Park, December 2002.
-
University
of Sydney, October 2002.
-
Centre for
the Philosophy of the Natural and the Social Sciences, London School of
Economics, May 2002.
“The Puzzle of the Arrow of Radiation,”
Department of Physics, University of Southern California, April 2002.
“Classical Electrodynamics and the Role of Consistency in
Scientific Theories.” presented at:
-
University
of Pittsburgh, February 2002.
-
University
of Maryland, College Park, February 2002.
-
University
of California at Irvine, January 2002.
“Non-Locality in Classical
Electrodynamics,” University of Southern California, November 2001.
“The Influence of Science on Philosophy
in the Late 19th Century: Comments on Papers by Michael Friedman and Mark
Wilson,” May 2001, Symposium at the 2001 APA Central Division meeting.
University of Illinois at Chicago
Philosophy of Physics Workshop, March 2001, Commentator on a paper by Craig
Callender.
“Explanatory Asymmetries: A Problem for Causal Theories of
Explanation?” University of Manitoba, Canada, January 2001.
“Local Models, Possible Worlds, and
Classical Electrodynamics,” California Institute of Technology, Los Angeles,
November 1999.
“In Search of Coherence? The Strange Tale of Classical
Electrodynamics” History and Philosophy
of Science Colloquium Series, Northwestern University, February 1999.
“Explanatory Patterns,” History and
Philosophy of Science Colloquium, University of Colorado, Boulder, December
1997.
“Models in Electrodynamics and the
Semantic View of Scientific Theories,” Centre for the Philosophy of the Natural
and the Social Sciences, London School of Economics, England, May 1997.
“Models as Truth-Makers and Models as
Representations,” Department of Philosophy, University of Leeds, England,
February 1997.
Other
Papers Given:
“Causes, Counterfactuals, and Entropy,”
Northwest Philosophy Conference, Reed College, October 2003.
“Laws and Initial Conditions,”
contribution to the symposium “Laws, Possibility, and
the New Instrumentalism,” Philosophy of Science Association Meeting, November
2002.
“Popper’s Pond and Elementary Radiation
Processes: Popper and Einstein on the
Arrow of Radiation,” Karl Popper Centennial
Conference 2002, Vienna, July 2002.
“Lorentz’s Cautious Realism
and the Electromagnetic World-Picture,” History of the Philosophy of Science
Conference 2002, Montreal, Canada, June 2002.
“David Lewis’s Overdetermination Thesis
or The Perils of Armchair Physical Theorizing,” Causation
and Explanation in the Natural and Social Sciences, Ghent University, Belgium,
May 2002.
“Non-Locality in Classical
Electrodynamics,” APA Pacific Division Meeting, San Francisco, March 2001.
“Explanatory Asymmetries: A Problem for Causal Theories of
Explanation?” 11th International Congress of Logic, Methodology and
Philosophy of Science, Cracow, Poland, August 1999.
“Truth and Isomorphism: Van Fraassen’s Explication of ‘Empirical
Adequacy’,” 3rd International Conference of the German Society of
Analytic Philosophy, Munich, Germany, September 1997.
“A Re-examination of the Distinction
between a Context of Discovery and a Context of Justification,” 10th
International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science,
Florence, Italy, August 1995.
Professional Activities:
Referee for the National Science
Foundation.
Referee for Philosophy of Science.
Referee for The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.