Ilya Farber - Oct. 26
George Washington University

Abstract
Current neural models of consciousness -- such as those of Llinas, Edelman, and Crick and Koch -- are rich in anatomical and functional detail, but the notion of consciousness employed in these models remains relatively simple. As a result, it remains open to question how much of the domain of consciousness the models really explain: can they only account for a fairly simple form of visual awareness, or can they also explain such things as the stream of consciousness, conscious thought, and conscious decision-making? In this talk I will present a relatively accessible synthesis of the current approaches, and discuss the metaphorical structure of the explanation that it provides. Once this structure is made explicit, it becomes easier to see that this sort of model can actually explain quite a lot.

Biography
Ilya Farber is an assistant professor of philosophy at George Washington University, and holds a joint PhD in Philosophy and Cognitive Science from the University of California, San Diego. In addition to scientific approaches to consciousness, he has research interests in philosophy of science (especially inter-level integration and realism), philosophy of mind and early American Pragmatism. He has several publications on consciousness, including a forthcoming chapter in the Wiley Comprehensive Handbook of Psychology (coauthored with William Banks) which provides some of the technical and experimental background for the model discussed in this talk.

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Fall 2001