CPaS Faculty

GEORGES REY e-mail: georey@earthlink.net

Professor of Philosophy; Ph. D., Harvard University.

Research interests: Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Psychology, Cognitive Science, Moral Psychology, Philosophy of Language, Logic & Metalogic.

Please see also his homepage in the philosophy department website.

Recent Conference : Early Content: Intentionality in Visual and Linguistic Perception  (April 21-22, 2006)

Recent Course Materials: click here

Books:

Contemporary Philosophy of Mind: A Contentiously Classical Approach, Cambridge: Blackwell (1997).

(editor w/ Barry Loewer): Meaning in Mind: Jerry Fodor and His Critics, London: Blackwell 1991.

Articles:

"Mind, Intentionality and Inexistence: an Overview of My Work," in Croatian Journal of Philosophy, vol.5, no. 15 (2005), pp. 389-415.

"Empty Representations in Linguistic Perception," for the "Early Content: Intentionality in Visual and Linguistic Perception" conference, University of Maryland, April 21-22, 2006.

"Resisting Normativism in Psychology," forthcoming in Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind, Blackwell.

"Conventions, Intuitions and Linguistic Inexistents: a Reply to Devitt," forthcoming in Croatian Journal of Philosophy.

"Phenomenal Content and the Richness and Determinacy of Color Experience," forthcoming in Journal of Consciousness Studies.

"Meta-Atheism: Religious Avowal as Self-Deception," in The Experience of Philosophy, (Martin, R. & Kolak, D, eds.) Oxford, 2005.

"Philosophical Analysis as Cognitive Psychology: the Case of Empty Concepts" in Handbook of Categorization in Cognitive Science, Cohen, H. & Lefebvre, C., eds., Dordrecht: Elsevier, pp. 71-89 (2005).

"The Rashness of Traditional Rationalism and Empiricism," in New Essays in the Philosophy of Language and Mind, ed. by M. Ezcurdia, R. Stainton, and C. Viger, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 30, pp. 227-58 (2005).

"Representational Content and a Chomskyan Linguistics," in Epistemology of Language, ed. by Alex Barber, Oxford University Press (2003), pp. 140-86.

"Why Wittgenstein Ought to Have Been a Computationalist (and What a Computationalist Can Learn from Wittgenstein)," in Croatian Journal of Philosophy , vol. 3, no. 9 (2003), pp. 231-264.

"Entries on computational theories of mind, concepts, eliminativism, folk psychology, the language of thought, philosophy of mind, and unconscious mental states", in the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, London, 1998.

"Towards a Projectivist Account of Conscious Experience," Ferdinand-Schoningh-Verlag (1996), pp. 123-142.

"Dennett's Unrealistic Psychology," Philosophical Topics vol. 22 no. 1-2, (1996), pp. 259-89.

"Keeping Meaning More in Mind," Intellectica, 1996.

"Resisting Primitive Compulsions," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research vol.56 (1996), pp. 419-424.

"A Not "Merely Empirical" Argument for the Language of Thought," in J. Tomberlin (ed.) Philosophical Perspectives, 9 ("AI, Connectionism, and Philosophical Psychology"), 1995, pp. 201-222.

"When Other Things Aren't Equal: Saving Ceteris Paribus Laws from Vacuity" (with Paul Pietroski), The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science vol. 46 (1995), 81-110.